Transmit Filter and Artificial Noise Design for Secure MIMO-OFDM Systems by Liu, Wenfei et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
08
00
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
6 A
pr
 20
17
1
Transmit Filter and Artificial Noise Design for
Secure MIMO-OFDM Systems
Wenfei Liu†, Ming Li†, Xiaowen Tian†, Zihuan Wang†, and Qian Liu‡
†School of Information and Communication Engineering
Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, Liaoning 116024, China
E-mail: {liuwenfei, tianxw, wangzihuan}@mail.dlut.edu.cn, mli@dlut.edu.cn
‡ School of Computer Science and Technology
Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, Liaoning 116024, China
E-mail: qianliu@dlut.edu.cn
Abstract—Physical layer security has been considered as an im-
portant security approach in wireless communications to protect
legitimate transmission from passive eavesdroppers. This paper
investigates the physical layer security of a wireless multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) communication system in the presence of
a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. We first propose a transmit-
filter-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM system which can destroy the
orthogonality of eavesdropper’s signals. Our proposed transmit
filter can disturb the reception of eavesdropper while maintaining
the quality of legitimate transmission. Then, we propose another
artificial noise (AN)-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM system to
further improve the security of the legitimate transmission. The
time-domain AN signal is designed to disturb the reception
of eavesdropper while the legitimate transmission will not be
affected. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the
security performance of the proposed transmit filter design and
AN-assisted scheme in the MIMO-OFDM system.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, transmit filter, MIMO-
OFDM, artificial noise, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of wireless communication sys-
tems, security has become a crucial issue in wireless networks
due to open broadcast nature. Especially, when the impor-
tant information is transmitting via the wireless medium, an
eavesdropper can also receive the signals, resulting in a great
threat to the security of the wireless communication systems
[1]. Therefore, it is essential for the legitimate transceiver to
apply security transmission schemes. Current security schemes
rely on the conventional encryption mechanism. However, the
cryptography algorithms are based on the computational hard-
ness assumptions, which are still mathematically unproven.
Physical layer security is now recognized as an alternative
technique in achieving security transmission, which exploits
the physical characteristic of wireless channels.
The main principle of physical layer security is making
use of the randomness of the wireless channels to disturb
eavesdropper’s reception without relying on the upper-layer
[2]. Many initial physical layer security techniques are in-
vestigated in an information-theoretic way. For example, a
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seminal physical layer security work proposed by Wyner
[3]. Wyner proved that if the wiretap channel was worse
than the legitimate channel, then the communication of the
legitimate receiver can achieve secure transmission. Based
on the pioneering studies of physical layer security, many
researches on secrecy capacity have been studied for different
channel models, such as Gaussian noise channel, fading chan-
nel, Gaussian broadcast channel, etc. Beamforming and power
allocation techniques are also investigated to achieve secrecy
capacity [4]-[8]. Artificial noise (AN) is another physical layer
security technique. AN is generated in the null space of the
legitimate channel and can be canceled out at the legitimate
receiver but cannot be removed at the eavesdropper.
While most of the previous researches focus on information-
theoretic analysis, there is also a growing need to provide prac-
tical security solutions. Recently, OFDM has been widely used
in wireless communications due to its high performance and
low complexity, and the physical layer security in the applica-
tion of OFDM systems is also well-noticed. Early information-
theoretic based techniques utilized in OFDM systems are
basically channel coding and cryptography [9]-[11]. In [12],
the authors proposed a time-domain AN based physical layer
security technology in OFDM systems. In MIMO systems,
transmit beamforming designs have been universally utilized
by exploiting the spatial degrees of freedom to enhance the
physical layer security [13]-[16]. In MIMO-OFDM systems,
which have both the advantages of MIMO systems and OFDM
systems, physical layer security are also studied [17]-[19].
Inspired by the above studies, in this paper, we propose a
transmit-filter-assisted secure scheme and AN-assisted secure
scheme in MIMO-OFDM systems. We assume that the trans-
mitter has perfect knowledge of the channel state information
(CSI) of legitimate channel. Based on the diversity of the
legitimate channel and wiretap channel, the transmit filter is
designed based on the legitimate CSI to deliberately destroy
the orthogonality of the transmitted signals. Only the legiti-
mate receiver can recover the original signals by making use
of the minimum mean square error (MMSE) filter to suppress
the inter-carrier interference (ICI). Finally, we apply the AN
approach to further improve the transmission security.
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Fig. 1: The filter-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM system.
represents transpose of a matrix. (·)H represents conjugate
transpose of a matrix. E{·} denotes statistical expectation.
Tr{X} denotes the trace of matrix X. CM×N represents
M × N matrices. IN represents an N × N identity ma-
trix. Diag(x1, . . . , xM ) represents the M ×M diagonal ma-
trix whose diagonal elements are x1 to xM . null(·) repre-
sents the orthonormal bases for the null space of a matrix.
blkdiag(A1,A2, . . . ,AN ) denotes a block diagonal matrix
where the enclosed elements are diagonal blocks. ⊗ is the
Kronecker product. The function min(·, ·) returns the mini-
mum among the values enclosed in brackets. ‖ · ‖ denotes the
Enclidean norm of a vector. [·]i,k denotes the (i, k)th entry of
a matrix. [·]k denotes the kth entry of a vector.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a MIMO-OFDM communication system with
one transmitter (Alice), one legitimate receiver (Bob), and one
eavesdropper (Eve). The number of antennas at node m ∈
{A,B,E} is Nm.
In order to clearly present our MIMO-OFDM system,
we first mathematically express the conventional single-input
single-output (SISO)-OFDM transmission procedure. Let s ,
[s1, s2, . . . , sN ]
T denotes the transmitted signals, where N is
the number of subcarriers. F and FH denote the N ×N FFT
and IFFT matrices, respectively. Tcp and Rcp are the cyclic
prefix (CP) insertion matrix and removal matrix, respectively.
The legitimate channel matrix H is a (N +Ncp)× (N+Ncp)
Toeplitz matrix which can be expressed as
H =


h(1) 0 0 . . . 0
... h(1) 0 . . . 0
h(L) . . .
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . .
. . . 0
0 . . . h(L) . . . h(1)


, (1)
where h(l), l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, is the channel impulse response
from Alice to Bob, and L < Ncp is the maximum delay
spread. At the receiver, frequency-domain signal of Bob can
be expressed as
yb = FRcpHTcpF
HPs+ nb (2)
where nb ∼ CN (0, σ2nIN ) is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) vector at the legitimate receiver.
After explicitly explaining the mathematical model of the
conventional SISO-OFDM system, we turn to present the wire-
tap MIMO-OFDM system model as shown in Fig. 1. As for a
MIMO-OFDM system, the original signal is firstly processed
by a transmit beamformer/filterWt, and then transformed to
the time domain by IFFT. After CP insertion, the transmitted
signal arrives at the receiver through the multipath Rayleigh
fading channel. Then, Bob and Eve will remove CP and
convert it to the frequency-domain signal by FFT. After that
both Bob and Eve use receive filters to recover the original
signals.
To mathematically express the MIMO-OFDM system, let
s , [s1,1, . . . , s1,N , . . . , sNs,1, . . . , sNs,N ]
T represent the
symbol vector to be transmitted via the corresponding sub-
carriers, E{‖si,j‖2} = 1, N is the number of orthogonal
subcarriers, Ns is the number of data streams of per subcarrier
with Ns ≤ NA. Let FNm = INm ⊗ F ∈ CNmN×NmN
denote the FFT operation at a node with Nm antennas.
FNB = blkdiag(F,F, ...,F) is the FFT matrix and F
H
NA
=
blkdiag(FH,FH , ...,FH) is the IFFT matrix. The matrix for
CP insertion is denoted by T
cp
NA
∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×NAN , where
T
cp
NA
= blkdiag(Tcp, ...,Tcp). R
cp
NB
∈ CNB(N+Ncp)×NBN is
the CP removal matrix, and R
cp
NB
= blkdiag(Rcp, ...,Rcp).
Wt ∈ CNAN×NsN is the transmit beamformer/filter which
has a power constraint, i.e. Tr(WtW
H
t ) ≤ Pt, where Pt is
the total transmit power. H ∈ CNB(N+Ncp)×NA(N+Ncp) is
the Alice-to-Bob MIMO multipath channel matrix which is
constructed by
H =


H1,1 . . . H1,NA
...
. . .
...
HNB,1 . . . HNB ,NA

 , (3)
Hk,i ∈ C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) is the channel impulse response
between the ith antenna of Alice and the kth antenna of Bob,
which has a form of
Hk,i =


hk,i(1) 0 0 . . . 0
... hk,i(1) 0 . . . 0
hk,i(L) . . .
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . .
. . . 0
0 . . . hk,i(L) . . . hk,i(1)


. (4)
The received frequency-domain signal at all antennas of the
legitimate receiver can be expressed as
yb = FNBR
cp
NB
HT
cp
NA
FHNAWts+ zb
= H˜Wts+ zb, (5)
where yb ∈ CNBN×1 is the received signal vector at Bob, zb ∼
CN (0, σ2nINBN ) is the AWGN vector at Bob, the effective
channel matrix
H˜ , FNBR
cp
NB
HT
cp
NA
FHNA
= blkdiag(H˜1, H˜2, . . . , H˜N) (6)
is block-diagonal, where H˜n ∈ CNB×NA represents the
frequency-domain channel matrix of the nth subcarrier from
the transmitter to the legitimate receiver.
The Alice-to-Eve channel matrixG, whose size is NE(N+
Ncp)×NA(N +Ncp), has similar constructure as (3), and the
received signals at Eve can be given as
ye = FNER
cp
NE
GT
cp
NA
FHNAWts+ ze
= G˜Wts + ze, (7)
where ye ∈ CNEN×1 is the received signal vector at Eve.
FNE ∈ CNEN×NEN is the FFT matrix of Eve. RcpNE ∈
CNEN×NE(N+Ncp) is the CP removal matrix performed at
Eve. ze ∼ CN (0, σ2nINEN ) is the AWGN vector at Eve. The
equivalent channel matrix
G˜ , FNER
cp
NE
GT
cp
NA
FHNA
= blkdiag(G˜1, G˜2, . . . , G˜N ) (8)
is also block-diagonal, where G˜n ∈ CNE×NA represents the
frequency-domain channel matrix of the nth subcarrier from
the transmitter to the eavesdropper.
After describing the above system model, we can see that
the equivalent channel matrix H˜ and G˜ have similar structures.
This will threaten the MIMO-OFDM systems because Eve
can recover the transmitted signals after some demodulation
processes. In order to prevent eavesdropping, we propose
a transmit-filter-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM technique to
maintain the communication security. The transmit filter aims
to disturb the received signal of Eve while maintaining the
Alice-to-Bob transmission, as will be presented in Section III.
III. TRANSMIT FILTER DESIGN IN MIMO-OFDM SYSTEM
This section is devoted to design the transmit filter in secure
MIMO-OFDM system to disturb the reception of Eve. We
assume that Alice knows the CSI of the Alice-to-Bob channel
link while Eve does not. Based on the diversity between the
legitimate channel and wiretap channel, Alice designs the
transmit filter to deliberately destroy the orthogonality of the
transmitted signals. Both Bob and Eve adopt the MMSE filter
to suppress the ICI. However, Eve cannot recover the destroyed
signals as what Bob does and then the transmission security
can be maintained.
After employing the transmit filter in the frequency-domain,
the received MIMO-OFDM signals at Bob and Eve are not
orthogonal, i.e. H˜Wt and G˜Wt are not diagonal matrixes.
At the receiver, Bob uses the MMSE receive filter to suppress
the inter-subcarrier interference. The recovered signal can be
expressed as
sˆb =W
H
b yb, (9)
where Wb is the MMSE receive filter at Bob which is well
known as
Wb =(H˜WtW
H
t H˜
H + σ2zbI)
−1
H˜Wt
=(FNBR
cp
NB
HT
cp
NA
F
H
NA
WtW
H
t FNAT
cp
NA
H
H
H
R
cp
NB
H
F
H
NB
+ σ2zbI)
−1
FNBR
cp
NB
HT
cp
NA
F
H
NA
Wt.
(10)
Then, with the above MMSE receive filter Wb, the mean
squared error (MSE) at Bob is
Γb =E{‖sˆb − s‖
2}
=E{‖WHb yb − s‖
2}
=Tr{WbWb
H
H˜WtWt
H
H˜
H}+ σ2zbTr{WbWb
H}
− Tr{Wb
H
H˜Wt} − Tr{Wt
H
H˜
H
Wb}+NsN.
(11)
Submiting the MMSE receive filter (10) in (11), we can
rewrite the MSE at Bob as
Γb =Tr{(H˜WtWt
H
H
H + σ2zbI)
−1
H˜WtWt
H
H˜
H}
2
+ σ2zbTr{(H˜WtWt
H
H˜
H + σ2zbI)
−1
H˜WtWt
H
H
H
(H˜WtWt
H
H
H + σ2zbI)
−1} − 2Tr{(H˜WtWt
H
H
H
+ σ2zbI)
−1
H˜WtWt
H
H˜
H}+NsN.
(12)
Our purpose is to design the transmit filter Wt which
minimizes the MSE (Γb). Obviously, this problem is too
difficult to be solved. Therefore, we turn to find a suboptimal
solution to design Wt. Since the effective channel H˜ is
available to Alice, we can make the singular value decom-
position (SVD) of H˜ as H˜ = UΣVH . The columns of
U ∈ CNBN×NBN are the left-singular vector of H˜ and the
columns of V ∈ CNAN×NAN are the right-singular vector of
H˜.Σ = Diag(σ1, . . . , σα) ∈ CNBN×NAN contains the singu-
lar values, where α = min(NAN,NBN), and σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σα.
To transmit NsN symbols, we simply select the first NsN
columns of V as Vt.
Then, the term H˜WtWt
HH˜H in (12) can be rewritten as
H˜WtWt
HH˜H = UΣVHt WtWt
HVtΣ
HUH . (13)
For simplification design purpose, let
Wt = VtP (14)
be the transmit filter design, where P denotes the transmit
power matrix andP = Diag(
√
p1, . . . ,
√
pNsN ). The equation
(13) can be further simplified as
H˜WtWt
HH˜H = UΛUH , (15)
where Λ = ΣP2ΣH = Diag(λ1, . . . , λNsN ). Substituting
(15) in the original objective function (12), Γb can be further
expressed as
Γb =Tr{((Λ+ σ2zbI)−1Λ)2}+ σ2nTr{(Λ+ σ2zbI)−1Λ
(Λ+ σ2zbI)
−1} − 2Tr{(Λ+ σ2ZbI)−1Λ}+NsN
=
NsN∑
i=1
σ2zb
σ2i pi + σ
2
zb
.
(16)
After the above equation transform, we turn to solve the
power allocation problem for subcarriers instead of the original
optimization problem. The final transmit filter design problem
can be expressed as
min
NsN∑
i=1
σ2zb
σ2i pi + σ
2
zb
s.t.
NsN∑
i=1
pi ≤ Pt,
pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , NsN.
(17)
This power allocation problem can be easily solved by some
existing solvers such as CVX solvers. After working out the
power allocation of different subcarriers, we can obtain the
transmit filter Wt = VtP.
As for Eve, she also uses MMSE receive filter to recover
the transmit signals. Similarly as Bob, the recovered signal of
Eve can be expressed as
sˆe =W
H
e ye, (18)
where We is the MMSE receive filter which has a similar
form as (10)
We =(G˜WtW
H
t G˜
H + σ2zeI)
−1
G˜Wt
=(FNER
cp
NE
GT
cp
NA
F
H
NA
WtW
H
t FNAT
cp
NA
H
H
H
R
cp
NE
H
F
H
NE
+ σ2zeI)
−1
FNER
cp
NE
GT
cp
NA
F
H
NA
Wt.
(19)
The MSE at Eve is
Γe =Tr{WeWe
H
G˜WtWt
H
G˜
H}+ σ2zeTr{WeWe
H}
− Tr{We
H
G˜Wt} − Tr{Wt
H
G˜
H
We}+NsN.
(20)
Based on the fact that the transmit filter Wt is designed
to minimize Γb by the use of legitimate CSI H, Bob can
efficiently recover the original signals by employing the re-
ceive filter. However, due to the diversity between the wiretap
channel G and the legitimate channel H, the MSE at Eve Γe
is much higher than Γb. Therefore, after applying the transmit
filter, the received signals at Eve will be disturbed and the
security will be enhanced.
IV. ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN IN MIMO-OFDM SYSTEM
After developing the transmit-filter-assisted secure scheme,
we find that the transformed power allocation problem in
section III is intriguing. And it is sensible to adopt another
AN-assisted scheme utilizing the residual power to further
guarantee the security of the transmission.
Let γb denote the MSE threshold of Alice-to-Bob transmis-
sion. When Γb ≤ γb, the quality of legitimate transmission
can be maintained to a certain extend according to γb. Let Pt
represent the total transmit power. Denote Pc =
∑NsN
i=1
pi
as the consumed power of all symbols utilized to satisfy
the MSE constraint Γb ≤ γb. Pa = Pt − Pc represents the
residual power after power allocation for different subcarriers.
When the MSE constraint is met, i.e., Γb ≤ γb, there exists a
minimum power consumption Pc which not only satisfying the
legitimate transmission quality, but also has the largest residual
power Pa in generating AN. Therefore, the task of the AN-
assisted scheme is to minimize the power of all subcarriers Pc
under the constraint of Alice-to-Bob transmission quality. The
optimal problem can be formulated as follows:
min
NsN∑
i=1
pi
s.t.
NsN∑
i=1
σ2zb
σ2i pi + σ
2
zb
≤ γb,
NsN∑
i=1
pi ≤ Pt,
pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , NsN.
(21)
The solution of this optimal problem can be easily obtained
by CVX solvers. After solving this restrained power allocation
problem, the residual power is Pa = Pt−Pc. Alice generates
AN in the time-domain with residual power Pa to interfere the
reception of the eavesdropper with the legitimate transmission
not affected. AN is applied to the transmission after inserting
CP, the received symbols of Bob can be represented as
yb = FNBR
cp
NB
H(TcpNAF
H
NA
Wts + za) + zb
= H˜Wts + FNBR
cp
NB
Hza + zb, (22)
where za ∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×1 is the generated AN vector. Pa =
Tr{E{zazaH}} is the power of AN.
In this AN-assisted scheme, AN should be laid in the null
space of the Alice-to-Bob channel link so that AN will not
influence Bob’s reception. Therefore, AN can be generated as
za = Qad, (23)
where Qa = null (R
cp
NB
H) is an NA(N +Ncp)-by-N(NA −
Ns) +NcpNA matrix, i.e.
R
cp
NB
HQa = 0, (24)
QaQa
H = INA(N+Ncp), (25)
d is (N(NA−Ns)+NcpNA)×1 zero-mean complex Gaussian
random vector which has the variance of σ2d. Then, the
received symbols of Bob in (22) can be rewritten as
yb = FNBR
cp
NB
H(TcpNAF
H
NA
Wts + za) + zb
= H˜Wts + zb. (26)
As for Eve, due to the diversity of channel characteristic,
Eve cannot eliminate the affect of AN. The received signal at
Eve can be expressed as
ye = FNER
cp
NE
G(TcpNAF
H
NA
Wts+ za) + ze
= G˜Wts+ FNER
cp
NE
Gza + ze. (27)
Since the legitimate channel H is different from the eaves-
dropping channelG, i.e.R
cp
NE
Gza 6= 0, Eve cannot cancel out
AN as Bob does. Therefore, the proposed AN-assisted scheme
can further prevent Eve from eavesdropping and increase the
security capacity of the MIMO-OFDM systems.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed
transmit-filter-assisted and AN-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM
systems. We evaluate the average bit-error-rate (BER) of both
Bob and Eve for various total transmit power, the number
of subcarriers, the number of antennas at Alice and MMSE
constraints. The simulation results are experienced over 105
channel realizations.
In this simulation, Alice tries to establish a secure trans-
mission between herself and Bob in the presence of Eve,
using a MIMO-OFDM wireless communication system which
has N = 64 subcarriers and Ncp = 16. The number of
antennas at Alice is NA = 4, and NB = NE = 2, Ns = 2.
Fig. 2 shows the BERs of Bob and Eve under different
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Fig. 2: BER versus transmit power (N = 64 subcarriers, length
of CP Ncp = 16, NA = 4, NB = NE = Ns = 2).
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Fig. 3: BER versus transmit power (N = 128 subcarriers,
length of CP Ncp = 32, NA = 4, NB = NE = Ns = 2).
total transmit power constraints. For comparison purpose, we
compare the SVD-filter-based scheme [20] with our proposed
algorithm. For the proposed transmit-filter-assisted scheme,
the BER of Bob is much lower than the conventional SVD-
filter-based MIMO-OFDM system. However, the BERs of Eve
in both our proposed system and SVD-filter-based system
are merely the same and very high, which means that Eve’s
reception has been significantly degraded. We can also observe
from Fig. 2 that the BER gap between Bob and Eve in our
proposed scheme is significantly enlarged comparing with the
conventional SVD scheme, which demonstrates that our pro-
posed MMSE-filter-assisted MIMO-OFDM system has better
security performance.
Then, the simulation results for a MIMO-OFDM system
with N = 128 subcarriers and Ncp = 32 are shown in Fig. 3,
which has the similar performance as Fig. 2. The BER of Bob
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Fig. 4: BER versus the numbers of antennas at Alice (N = 64
subcarriers, Ncp = 16, NB = NE = Ns = 2).
in MMSE-filter-assisted system can achieve (by all practical
measures) errorless transmission at SINR 6dB, while Eve
has much higher error rate. These findings demonstrate that
the proposed MMSE-filter-assisted scheme can significantly
ensure the security of MIMO-OFDM systems.
Fig. 4 shows the BERs of Bob and Eve for various numbers
of antennas at Alice. We evaluate the number of NA from
2 to 10 and fix NB = NE = Ns = 2. The number of
subcarriers N = 64 and the length of CP Ncp = 16. From
Fig. 4 we can notice that with the increase of the number
of antennas at Alice, the BERs of Bob will decrease to a
large extent while the BERs of Eve remains unchanged. The
reason is that the larger antennas of Alice, the more degrees
of freedom (DoF) to design signals for anti-eavesdropping. In
Fig. 4, the BER of Bob with the proposed approach is much
lower than the SVD scheme which illustrates our proposed
scheme can achieve much better performance in the MIMO-
OFDM wireless communications.
Next, we present the performance of the AN-assisted secure
MIMO-OFDM scheme in Fig. 5. We fix the MMSE constraint
as γb = 10 and show the BERs of Bob and Eve as a function
of Pt/NsN . In Fig. 5, the BER gap between Bob and Eve
in the proposed AN-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM system is
enlarged comparing with no AN scheme. With the MMSE
constraint, the BER of Bob nearly keeps in a straight line.
Moreover, the BER of Bob remains unchanged when adding
AN which illustrates that AN will be canceled out at Bob and
can further disturb the reception of Eve.
In Fig. 6, the total transmit power is fixed as Pt = 50dB
and the horizontal axis is the MMSE constraint γb of Γb at
Bob (i.e. Γb ≤ γb). Fig. 6 shows that the BER of Eve is higher
when adding AN while the BER of Bob remains unchanged.
It illustrates that AN can prevent Eve from eavesdropping and
maintain the security of Alice-to-Bob transmission. Fig. 6 also
shows that with the increase of γb, the performance of Bob will
be worse which demonstrates that our proposed MMSE-filter-
assisted MIMO-OFDM scheme can influence the performance
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Fig. 5: BER versus total transmit power (N = 64, Ncp = 16,
NA = 4, NB = NE = Ns = 2, MMSE constraint γb = 10).
of Bob. The numerical results show that the proposed AN-
assisted secure MIMO-OFDM scheme can achieve better
security transmission than the MIMO-OFDM system without
AN.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of securing the
MIMO-OFDM wireless transmission between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper.
We proposed two novel schemes to improve physical layer
security for MIMO-OFDM wireless communication systems.
The MMSE-filter-assisted secure MIMO-OFDM system aims
to disturb the orthogonality of the received signals at Eve to en-
hance the security of the Alice-to-Bob transmission. To further
improve the performance, we proposed another AN-assisted
scheme to enhance the physical layer security in MIMO-
OFDM systems. Simulation results shown that the proposed
schemes can significantly improve the physical layer security
for the MIMO-OFDM wireless communication systems.
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